Montaigne was wrong about almost everything, which is the point

have upon what is past, have hit upon the most universal of human errors, if that may

be called an error to which nature herself has disposed us, in order to the continuation

of her own work, prepossessing us, among several others, with this deceiving imagination as

being more jealous of our action than afraid of our knowledge.

We are never present with, but always beyond, ourselves, fear, desire, hope, still push

us on towards the future, depriving us, in the meantime, of the sense and consideration

of that which is to amuse us with the thought of what shall be, even when we shall be no

more.

Rousseau, Emile, Livretu, Callimetosis, Es animus futuri auxius.

The mind anxious about the future is unhappy, Seneca, Epistle, Lae, 98.

We find this great precept often repeated in Plato, "Do thine own work, and know thyself."

Of which two parts, both the one and the other generally, comprehend our whole duty, and

do each of them in like manner involve the other.

For who will do his own work or write will find that his first lesson is to know what

he is, and that which is proper to himself, and who rightly understands himself will never

mistake another man's work for his own, but will love and improve himself above all other

things, will refuse superfluous employments, and reject all unprofitable thoughts and propositions.

As folly, on the one side, though it should enjoy all desire, would not withstanding never

be content, so on the other, wisdom, acquiescent in the present, is never dissatisfied with

himself, Cicero, Tuscalung, Dispussations, 57, v. 18.

Epicurus dispenses his sages from all foresight and care of the future.

Among those laws that relate to the dead, I look upon that to be very sound by which

the actions of princes are to be examined after their disease, Daodus, Ciclus, I, 6.

They are equals with, if not masters of the laws, and therefore what justice could not

inflict upon their persons, tis but reason should be executed upon their reputations

and the estates of their successors, things that we often value above life itself.

Tis a custom of singular advantage to those countries where it is in use, and by all good

princes to be desired, who have reason to take it ill, that the memories of the wicked

should be used with the same reverence and respect with their own.

We owe subjection and obedience to all our kings, whether good or bad, alike, for that

has respect unto their office; but as to esteem and affection, these are only due to their

virtue.

Let us grant to political government to endure them with patience, however unworthy, to conceal

their vices, and to assist them with our recommendation in their indifferent actions, whilst their authority

stands in need of our support.

But the relation of prince and subject being once at an end, there is no reason we should

deny the expression of our real opinions to our own liberty and common justice, and especially

to interdict to good subjects the glory of having reverently and faithfully served the

prince, whose imperfections were to them so well known.

This were to deprive posterity of a useful example, and such as, out of respect to some

private obligation, unjustly espoused and vindicate the memory of a faulty prince do

private right at the expense of public justice.

Livy does, very truly say, thirty-five, forty-eight, that the language of men bred up in courts

is always full of vain ostentation and false testimony, every one indifferently magnifying

his own master, and stretching his commendation to the utmost extent of virtue and sovereign

grandeur.

One may condemn the freedom of those two soldiers who so roundly answered near-oath to his beard,

the one being asked by him why he bore him ill will.

I love thee, answered he, whilst thou art worthy of it, but since thou art become a parasite

and incendiary, a player and a coachman, I hate thee as thou art worthy of it.